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Abstract 
This article provides a review of economic studies analyzing the use of multiple policies – a so-
called policy mix – to cope with single pollution problems. To guide and structure the review, an 
analytical framework is developed and applied. The framework integrates transaction costs into 
the analysis of pollution problems and policies to overcome them. Moreover, it understands a 
pollution externality not only as a market failure but more generally as the failure of private gov-
ernance structures. Based on this insight, two rationales for using a policy mix are identified. 
First, a policy mix may help to correct for multiple reinforcing failures of private governance 
structures, such as pollution externalities and technological spillovers. Second, a policy mix can 
be employed if the implementation of single first-best policies brings about high transaction costs 
– e.g., when marginal pollution damages are heterogeneous or polluters are unlikely to comply 
with the policy. For each rationale, the relevant literature is presented. Based on the review, ave-
nues for future research are identified. 
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1 Introduction 
Pollution control strategies employed by governments used to be based mainly on command-
and-control policies. During the last two decades, however, these policies have been supple-
mented by a variety of new approaches. These include market-based policies, such as taxes, sub-
sidies or permit trading systems, as well as voluntary programs or information measures. As a 
result of this development, a so-called policy mix is nowadays employed in many countries to 
cope with single pollution problems (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; OECD 2007). In many 
EU Member States, for example, strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are based on a 
policy mix. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is complemented by domestic policies such as 
energy taxes, subsidies for renewable energy sources or measures promoting energy efficiency 
(Sorrell et al. 2003).  
As the number of policies employed to cope with a single pollution problem increases, concerns 
about the integrity of the policy mix grow. The question arises whether the policy mix has been 
designed such that it makes use of synergies and avoids contradictions between the different 
policies – or whether one has to fear “[…] that the policy mix will degenerate into a policy mess” 
(Sorrell et al. 2003, p. VI). 
In traditional environmental economics, the answer to this question would have been clear-cut: 
Use one policy to mitigate a pollution problem and abolish all others. Economists like Pigou 
(1920) and Dales (1968) argued that a single tax or tradable permit system corrects for a pollution 
externality efficiently. They assumed that markets were perfect in other respects and that policies 
could be perfectly implemented at zero cost. The use of multiple policies was considered a re-
dundancy at best and an inefficient “policy mess” at worst (Johnstone 2003, p. 5). The majority 
of environmental-economic studies has therefore analyzed the performance of single policies or 
compared two or more policies for pollution control.  
However, there is an emerging field of economic research that discusses rationales for using a 
policy mix. Studies highlight that in a second-best world – where deviations from the ideal of the 
perfect market are numerous and policy implementation is subject to a variety of constraints – a 
policy mix may be superior to single policies in terms of efficiency. Policies applied simultane-
ously may reinforce each other and compensate for disadvantages of single-policy strategies.  
Available economic studies on policy mixes are conducted against a large diversity of back-
grounds. On the one hand, they refer to different kinds of pollution problems, such as air pollu-
tion, water pollution, climate change or waste management. On the other hand, conclusions in 
favour of a policy mix are drawn under a variety of different conditions, such as knowledge spill-
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overs or uncertainty. This large diversity raises the demand for a systematic and comprehensive 
overview of the economic literature on using a policy mix. Moreover, the question arises whether 
there is a set of general rationales for using a policy mix which overarches the economic literature 
despite its diversity. 
This article provides a review of existing economic studies that bring forward arguments in fa-
vour of a policy mix. The studies taken into account focus on situations in which the combina-
tion of policies improves the efficiency of resource allocation. The review does therefore not 
address economic research which finds an existing policy mix to be inefficient. The review aims 
at a better understanding of general rationales for using a policy mix for pollution control. More-
over, it is meant to identify promising strands for further research.  
To guide the review, an analytical framework is developed. It is based on the seminal work by 
Coase (1960). The framework incorporates transaction costs into the analysis of pollution prob-
lems and of possible solutions to overcome them. Moreover, the framework emphasizes that the 
presence of a pollution externality is not only attributed to a market failure – as widely presumed 
in economics – but to the failure of private governance structures, including the market, bargains 
and firms, in general. Based on this insight, it is argued that two deviations from the traditional 
theoretical model may provide a rationale for using a policy mix. On the one hand, a pollution 
externality may not exist in isolation but be reinforced by other types of failures of private gov-
ernance structures, such as technological spillovers and asymmetric information. In this case, 
multiple policies may be needed to correct all failures simultaneously. On the other hand, a single 
first-best policy may not be implemented perfectly because the corresponding transaction costs 
would be too high. A policy mix may then be a useful means to reduce transaction costs. Along 
these two rationales, the literature review will be organized.  
The article is structured as follows: Section two presents the analytical framework. It reflects on 
Coase’s rationale for using regulation. Based on this elaboration, the two rationales for using a 
policy mix for pollution control are derived. Section three presents the strands of policy mix lit-
erature referring to the first rationale. Section four introduces studies related to the second ra-
tionale. Section five concludes and highlights possible avenues of future research. 
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2 Analytical Framework 
2.1 Coase’s Rationale for Using Regulation 
Pioneers in the analysis of environmental problems like Pigou (1920) argued that the presence of 
pollution externalities and other types of market failures calls for governments to regulate the 
market to obtain an efficient allocation of resources. Coase (1960) was the first to show that this 
conclusion was somewhat flawed. He finds that externalities come into being because of transac-
tion costs. Transaction costs have to be considered as well when discussing possible solutions, 
such as government regulation, to correct for externalities. Based on this finding, Coase con-
cludes that an unambiguous plea for government regulation to correct for externalities cannot be 
made. 
Transaction costs can be broadly defined as the costs of establishing, maintaining and transfer-
ring property rights in goods (Allen 1991).1 In this sense, a transaction is defined as a transfer of 
property rights (which requires the establishment and maintenance of rights). Coase (1960, pp. 
16-17) outlines that transactions can be carried out under different governance structures. On the 
one hand, transactions can be guided by private governance structures including the market, bar-
gains and firms. On the market, the transfer of property rights is organized decentrally by the 
pricing mechanism. With bargains in the Coasian sense, property rights are exchanged with indi-
vidual side payments. In firms, the decentral distribution of property rights is replaced by hierar-
chical decisions for certain economic activities. On the other hand, transactions can be carried 
out under public governance structures, such as government regulation.2 If the government inter-
venes in the market by regulations, it acts as a “super-firm” that coordinates the transfer and dis-
tribution of property rights for the entire society. Coase emphasizes that with none of these gov-
ernance structures the transfer of property rights is costless. Transaction costs may well differ 
between governance structures. However, with none of these governance structures transaction 
costs are per se higher or lower than with another. 
Using the insight on transaction costs, Coase (1960, pp. 15-16) explains the presence of pollution 
externalities in the absence of government regulation. Property rights in natural resources, such 
                                                 
1 To have a property right implies that a person has secure control over a future benefit stream from a good 
(Bromley 1997, p. 3). Property rights include the rights to use a good and to exclude others from using it, to derive 
income or utility from a good, to change its form and substance, and to transfer all the rights in the good, or some 
rights, as desired (Furubotn and Richter 1997, p. 72). 
2 Williamson (1999) further developed Coase’s ideas on governance structures. He distinguishes between markets, 
firms, hybrids of markets and firms (bargains), regulation and public agencies. Regulation and public agencies are 
both types of public governance structures. With regulation, the government makes private actors carry out certain 
transactions and produce goods. With public agencies, the government itself produces a good, and all necessary 
transactions are carried out within the agency. An example for the latter is national defence.  
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as air or water, may not exist or may not be distributed optimally among private actors under 
neither private governance structure because the costs of establishing and transferring the rights 
would exceed the expected benefits. Therefore, many natural resources are non-excludable 
goods. This may allow some agents to use (and pollute) a natural resource and produce uncom-
pensated damages to other resource users to an extent that is beyond the socially optimal level, 
i.e. externalities are generated. Thus, pollution externalities persist because under any private gov-
ernance structure transaction costs of internalizing an additional unit of pollution damage (with-
out government intervention) are higher than the net value of internalization, i.e. the balance of 
welfare gains from reducing an additional unit of pollution damage and the costs to abate it. The 
presence of an externality does therefore not only result from a market failure – as widely pre-
sumed in economics – but from the failure of private governance structures – including markets, 
bargains and firms – in general. 
According to Coase (1960, p. 18), the failure of private governance structures to correct for pol-
lution externalities is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for regulation. Governments 
should only adopt a regulation to internalize a pollution externality if the expected net value of 
internalization exceeds the transaction costs of setting up and implementing the regulation. The 
Coasian rationale for using regulation for pollution control can therefore be generalized as fol-
lows:  
A government should implement a regulation if a) the difference D of the net 
value of internalizing an additional unit of a pollution externality and the 
transaction costs of bringing it about is positive for regulation and if b) D is lar-
ger for regulation than for any private governance structure.  
Suppose that the net value of internalization is the same under each governance structure. Condi-
tion b) then requires that the transaction costs of regulation be lower under regulation than under 
any private governance structure. If the net value of internalizing an additional unit of an exter-
nality is below the corresponding transaction costs under government regulation, further inter-
nalization by government regulation is not desirable from an economic point of view. In this 
case, existing pollution externalities can be considered as (Pareto-) irrelevant (Dahlman 1979).3 
Coase (1960, pp. 17-18) highlights that government intervention may lead to a reduction of trans-
action costs compared to private governance structures when the problem to solve involves a 
large number of people – which is the case with most pollution problems such as smoke emis-
                                                 
3 Dahlman (1979) even argues that if the government does not do any better than the market (or any other private 
governance structure), then there is no externality. In this sense, one can only speak of “market failure” (or failure of 
private governance structures in general) if the market fails to do as well as other governance structures. 
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sions. Above all, this can be attributed to the government’s power of coercion. The government 
may decide about the establishment, transfer and distribution of property rights, and it monopo-
lizes the forces within a certain territory to enforce its decisions, e.g. by the police. Yet, any gov-
ernment imposing a regulation may also face significant transaction costs, e.g. for determining the 
appropriate distribution of property rights and monitoring and enforcing the compliance of the 
regulated parties. Therefore, it cannot be determined on a general level whether or not govern-
ment regulation provides an efficient means to correct for an externality. Decisions can only be 
made on a case-by-case basis analyzing transaction costs empirically (Dahlman 1979; Zerbe and 
McCurdy 1999). 
2.2 Rationales for Using a Policy Mix 
When discussing the use of regulation, Coase (1960) is not specific about what kind of policies he 
refers to, and whether there should be one or multiple policies to correct for an externality. Nev-
ertheless, based on his rationale for using regulation, at least two rationales for using a policy mix 
can be derived. First, if a pollution externality is reinforced by other types of failures of private 
governance structures, one corrective policy may be needed for each failure. Second, a policy mix 
may help to correct for a pollution externality where regulation with a single first-best policy 
would involve (prohibitively) high transaction costs. 
2.2.1 Multiple Failures of Private Governance Structures 
Pollution externalities may be coupled with and reinforced by failures of private governance 
structures in other fields. In this case, correcting for the pollution externality only does not neces-
sarily provide for an optimal allocation of resources. Rather, it may be necessary to correct all 
failures simultaneously by implementing at least one policy for each failure. Two types of failure 
of private governance structures are of particular importance for environmental pollution prob-
lems: Technological spillovers and asymmetric information.4 Spillovers reinforce pollution exter-
nalities in a dynamic perspective while asymmetric information does so in a static perspective.  
Technological spillovers are generated by economic actors which innovate and thus contribute to 
technological change. Spillovers can be considered as positive externalities produced by the inno-
vator (Jaffe et al. 2005). On the market, other actors may benefit from the innovator’s knowledge 
                                                 
4 The coexistence of a pollution externality and market power in the output market theoretically provides another 
rationale for using a policy mix (Baumol and Oates 1988; Ebert 1992; Gersbach and Requate 2004). An optimal 
policy mix would encompass a Pigovian tax on pollution and an output subsidy to the monopolist or oligopolist. 
However, this policy mix is not addressed in this article since it is of little practical relevance. In fact, a regulator will 
usually have neither the authority nor the inclination to implement a subsidy to firms executing market power 
(Cropper and Oates 1992, p. 684).  
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about a new technology without having invested in research and development themselves and 
without paying compensation to the innovator. This is because knowledge is a public good. An 
innovator will usually be unable – despite patents – to perfectly protect the knowledge generated 
by him.5 Consequently, he may not be able to appropriate the complete social returns of his in-
novation. His incentives to innovate are reduced to those returns that he can actually realize at 
the private level. This results in significant underinvestment in R&D, relative to the social opti-
mum. Similarly, knowledge generated when actors adopt new technologies – e.g., by learning-by-
doing – may spill over to other market participants as well. Therefore, levels of technology inno-
vation and diffusion under the governance of the market are often too low from a social point of 
view. The market fails. However, the presence of spillovers implies that other types of private 
governance fail as well. Actors could form research joint ventures, which pool and coordinate the 
R&D efforts of several firms (which can be considered as a type of bargain) (Katsoulacos et al. 
2001). The innovating firm could also merge with other competitors into one firm (see, e.g., 
D'Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988). Both approaches would allow the innovator to appropriate 
more of the social benefits of his innovation. In Coase’s (1960) terms, private governance struc-
tures fail in correcting spillovers because the transaction costs of defining and transferring prop-
erty rights in technological knowledge are higher than the net value of reducing spillovers.  
Technological spillovers may reinforce pollution externalities positively, i.e. the worse the spill-
over, the worse the pollution externality. For example, technological spillovers may hamper the 
development of new and less costly technologies to mitigate pollution externalities. In the future, 
pollution reduction will be costlier than necessary and the level of the pollution externality will be 
worse compared to a situation with no technological spillovers. 
Asymmetric information is abundant in societies based on the division of labour with principal-
agent-relationships. Asymmetric information on markets can be attributed to the public good 
character of information (Jaffe et al. 2005, p. 168). In order to demonstrate the value of his in-
formation, the provider has to reveal at least part of it. Moreover, information may be known to 
others once it is transferred or used. Other actors may take advantage of the information without 
compensating the provider for its efforts.6 Therefore, the possessor of information may not be 
able to appropriate the total social value information provision brings about (Keck 1987). His 
                                                 
5 Patents are a means to prevent spillovers and to protect intellectual property rights. However, Jaffe et al. (2005, p. 
168) point out that the rewards the innovator can capture with patents will always be only a fraction of the overall 
benefits of an innovation to society. Moreover, Katsoulacos et al. (2001, p. 312) highlight that patents reward firms 
for discovering information but not for sharing it. Thus they provide an incentive to innovate but not to diffuse new 
technologies. 
6 In fact, asymmetric information can therefore be attributed to externalities of information provision. These can be 
considered positive if an actor is presumed to have the right to conceal information and negative if they have the 
duty to disclose information. 
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incentives to reveal information are reduced to his private returns. In fact, these returns may well 
be zero or negative. For example, if a producer provides information about the bad quality of his 
products, he will not be rewarded but rather lose clients. The possessor of information may 
therefore not have an incentive at all to disclose it. Consequently, the provision of information 
on the market is suboptimal and asymmetric information arises between market participants. The 
market fails. This failure gives rise to so-called external agency problems (Jaffe et al. 2002, p. 54). 
Economic actors may make adverse selections. Low-quality goods crowd out high-quality goods, 
and markets may even collapse (Akerlof 1974). Moreover, actors may use their information ad-
vantage and deliberately cheat others to maximize their private utility – a behaviour called moral 
hazard (see, e.g., Becker 1968). However, the presence of asymmetric information again indicates 
that not only the market but other private governance structures fail as well. Economic actors 
could privately initiate labelling and certification systems – which can be considered as one form 
of bargains. Moreover, information asymmetries could be overcome in a firm. This is an impor-
tant reason for vertical integration between producers and suppliers (see, e.g., Crocker 1983). 
However, information asymmetries may also prevail within a firm and cause internal agency 
problems (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné 1998; Jaffe et al. 2002, p. 54). In Coase’s (1960) terms, 
private governance structures fail in correcting for asymmetric information because defining and 
transferring property rights in information would bring about transaction costs that exceed the 
net value of reducing asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information may reinforce pollution externalities positively. For example, buyers 
who have a preference for non-polluting goods may not be able to identify such goods because 
of asymmetric information between the buyer and the supplier of the good. Buyers are therefore 
likely to acquire cheaper, but more polluting goods. Consequently, the pollution externality will 
be worse and correcting it will be costlier than in a situation with perfectly informed market par-
ticipants. 
As has been pointed out before, the failure of private governance structures does not necessarily 
justify government regulation in each case. Rather, a more complex, first rationale for using a 
policy mix for pollution control can be derived on this basis:  
A government should implement a policy mix for pollution control if a) a pollu-
tion problem can be attributed to multiple failures of private governance struc-
tures which reinforce each other, if b) for each of the failures, the difference D of 
the net value of reducing an additional unit of the failure and the transaction 
costs of bringing it about is positive for regulation, and if c) for each of the fail-
ures, D is larger for regulation than for any private governance structure. 
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If these conditions are met, the optimal policy mix encompasses at least one policy for each type 
of failure of private governance structures.  
2.2.2 High Transaction Costs of Regulation with Single First-Best Policies 
Coase (1960) points out that with different governance structures, such as markets, firms or regu-
lation, the net value and the transaction costs of internalizing an additional unit of an externality 
may differ. Likewise, it can be assumed that transaction costs may vary with different types of 
regulation, such as command-and-control or market-based policies. These can be understood as 
different types of public governance structures. For example, different policies may bring about 
different information requirements for designing a policy and monitoring and enforcing its im-
plementation. With some single first-best policies, the transaction costs of correcting a pollution 
externality may be very high. Transaction costs may even attain prohibitive levels where they ex-
ceed the expected net value of internalization. Alternative single-policy options may provide for 
lower transaction costs. However, they may not allow for an optimal allocation of resources and 
thus decrease the net value of internalization. Under certain conditions, combinations of the pro-
hibitively costly first-best policy with further policies or of several alternative policies may then 
yield a similar net value of internalization as the first-best policy at substantially reduced transac-
tion costs. Thus, a policy mix may be desirable from an efficiency point of view even though only 
the pollution externality, i.e. only one type of failure of private governance structures is present. 
A second rationale for using a policy mix for pollution control is therefore as follows:  
A government should implement a policy mix for pollution control if a) the dif-
ference D of the net value of internalizing an additional unit of the externality 
and the transaction costs of bringing it about is larger for regulation with a pol-
icy mix than for regulation with a single policy, if b) D is positive for regulation 
with a policy mix, and if c) D is larger for regulation with a policy mix than for 
any private governance structure. 
Condition a) includes the case where implementing a single first-best policy would involve pro-
hibitively high transaction costs and implementing a policy mix decreases transaction costs such 
that condition b) is met. It also includes the case where alternative single policies to the first-best 
policy could be implemented, i.e., D is positive for the single policy, but introducing a policy mix 
is superior since it increases the net value of internalization and/or decreases the transaction 
costs of internalization. 
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3 Using a Policy Mix to Cope with Multiple Failures of Private Governance Structures 
The economic literature on using a policy mix to cope with multiple reinforcing failures of pri-
vate governance structures focuses on cases where a pollution externality coincides with techno-
logical spillovers or asymmetric information. It is brought forward that with reinforcing failures 
of private governance structures, single pollution control policies do not provide for an efficient 
outcome. Instead, a policy mix may be required to correct for all failures simultaneously and to 
provide for a superior outcome. Available economic studies usually do not explicitly take the 
transaction costs of implementing such a policy mix into account. Rather, most studies implicitly 
assume that the balance of the net value of internalization and corresponding transactions costs is 
positive for regulation and larger than for any private governance structure. Moreover, most stud-
ies consider regulation as a means to correct for market failures while only few explicitly refer to 
the failures of the firm also. 
3.1 Pollution Externalities and Technological Spillovers 
3.1.1 Inefficiency of Single Policies 
Pollution control policies designed to overcome a pollution externality provide incentives to in-
vest in technological change only to a certain extent. Technological change may allow firms to 
comply with pollution policies at less cost. For example, firms may reduce their emissions tax 
burden if they discover new and cheaper technologies for emission reduction. There has been a 
broad scientific debate on how high these incentives are under different types of pollution con-
trol policied. It has been highlighted that market-based policies, such as taxes and tradable per-
mits, are superior to command-and-control policies (Downing and White 1986; Magat 1978; 
Zerbe 1970). Incentives to foster innovation and diffusion may also vary with market-based poli-
cies (Biglaiser and Horowitz 1995; Fischer et al. 2003; Jung et al. 1996; Milliman and Prince 
1989). Yet, an unambiguous ranking of policies appears to be impossible (Fischer et al. 2003; 
Grubb and Ulph 2002).  
More importantly, however, the incentives provided by either type of pollution policy are unlikely 
to be sufficient to overcome technological spillovers. Grubb et al. (1995) highlight that for cli-
mate change, the effects of emission mitigation policies may be dominated by technological spill-
overs. They estimate that the benefits of stimulating and adjusting innovation and diffusion di-
rectly may be up to seven times larger than the direct Pigovian benefits from initial emission re-
ductions. Grubb and Ulph (2002) point out that this finding implies that an optimal carbon tax 
would have to be set far above the level required if only pollution externalities are considered. 
Grubb and Ulph emphasize, however, that simply raising the level of a carbon tax will provide 
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for inefficiencies as well because not all carbon-reducing investments carry the same potential for 
long-run innovation. Rather, a more focused stimulation of innovation and diffusion is needed. 
Thus, pure pollution control policies are not efficient in a dynamic perspective.  
3.1.2 Superiority of a Policy Mix 
In the presence of pollution externalities and technological spillovers, a combination of pollution 
policies and technology policies may be superior to the exclusive use of the former. Several au-
thors suggest on a general level to combine tradable permits or taxes correcting for pollution 
externalities with subsidies addressing the spillovers (Jaffe et al. 2005; Johnstone 2003, p. 22; 
Sorrell et al. 2003, p. 69). Fischer (2004) argues that the combination of an emissions policy with 
a strong support for innovation is economically justified if knowledge spillovers are significant. 
Moreover, she demonstrates that welfare gains from adding a support policy for innovation are 
particularly high when the emission policy has not been set at a Pigovian level. Analyzing a du-
opoly with non-cooperative behaviour of firms, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) show that 
the combination of a R&D subsidy and a Pigovian emissions tax may achieve first-best levels of 
output, emissions and R&D spending. The optimal emissions tax is less than the marginal pollu-
tion damage. The optimal level of the subsidy depends on the deviation between the emission tax 
and the marginal pollution damage, the deviation between the private and social marginal product 
of R&D and the firms’ strategic incentives to invest in R&D.  
Katsoulacos et al. (2001) emphasize, however, that the coexistence of a pollution externality and 
technological spillovers may not call for a policy mix if the assumption of non-cooperative be-
haviour is relaxed. In fact, research joint ventures may help firms to overcome spillovers. Katsou-
lacos et al. demonstrate that under certain conditions it may be optimal to have a pollution con-
trol policy only and to allow for research joint ventures in addition. Thus, they assume that the 
balance of the net value of reducing spillovers and the corresponding transaction costs is larger 
under research joint ventures than under the market, the firm or government regulation. Regula-
tion is only required to correct for the pollution externality. 
Jaffe et al. (2005) emphasize that command-and-control policies mandating certain technological 
standards may also be an appropriate complement to pollution control policies. Command-and-
control policies may promote the diffusion of particular technologies by forcing less expensive 
and less environmentally friendly technologies from the market.7 As an example, Jaffe et al. cite 
energy-efficiency regulations in the US, such as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
                                                 
7 Jaffe et al. (2005) acknowledge, however, that such command-and-control policies bear the risk of going beyond an 
economically justified minimum, at which point they can impose limits to product choice, and undesirable costs if 
adopters are heterogeneous. 
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standards. These have been implemented in addition to gasoline taxes in order to improve the 
fuel efficiency of light-duty vehicles, such as passenger cars and small trucks. Agras and Chapman 
(1999) provide a rough idea of how such a policy mix may perform compared to the isolated 
utilization of each policy. They compute that when both policies are used jointly, only 41 percent 
of the levels determined for the single use of either CAFE standards or gasoline taxes would be 
necessary to achieve the US reduction targets for greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol. 
3.2 Pollution Externalities and Asymmetric Information 
3.2.1 Inefficiency of Single Policies 
If pollution externalities coincide with asymmetric information, policies that only address the 
pollution externality may be inefficient at reducing pollution. This is particularly emphasized for 
the presence of external information asymmetries between market participants. Bennear and 
Stavins (2007) highlight the case of markets for energy-efficient technologies remaining underde-
veloped despite the existence of pollution control policies. Pollution control policies increase 
energy costs. In theory, agents would have an incentive to switch to energy-efficient technologies, 
e.g. for domestic appliances or production processes. Yet, agents often do not respond efficiently 
to pollution control policies because they are not well informed about available options of en-
ergy-saving technologies. Jaffe et al. (2002) point out that this is particularly evident in the hous-
ing sector. In this sector, the tenant pays for fuel consumed for heating and for electricity. The 
landlord decides about appliances, such as the insulation of walls and windows or the installation 
of stoves, which affect the fuel and electricity demand of the tenant. With perfectly informed 
tenants and landlords, a single emissions tax on fuel or electricity may be efficient. In order to 
reduce their tax burden, tenants will prefer the most energy-efficient housings. Landlords, in turn, 
have an incentive to invest in energy-efficient technology. As Jaffe et al. (2005) highlight, how-
ever, tenants are hardly informed about the energy efficiency of buildings. Thus, they will be un-
able to identify the most energy-efficient options. This implies that landlords may be unable to 
recover the cost of energy-efficiency investments, and may not undertake them at all. Therefore, 
single emission policies cannot provide for energy-efficiency in the housing sector in the presence 
of asymmetric information.  
Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1998) point out that the efficiency of pollution control policies may 
also be hampered by internal information problems within the firm. Firms’ reactions to pollution 
control policies are guided by complex, multistep and imperfect management systems. Informa-
tion transmission from the top management to the simple employee level is characterized by a 
variety of principal-agent-relationships. The firm’s final reaction to a policy – and thus the actual 
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efficiency of a policy – is therefore a function of the incentives and capacities of all agents within 
the firm and may well deviate from the outcome with rational, profit-maximizing agents. 
3.2.2 Superiority of a Policy Mix 
The failure of pollution control policies to overcome asymmetric information provides a rationale 
for combining them with information policies. This is particularly brought forward in the eco-
nomic literature with respect to external information problems between market participants. 
Petrakis et al. (2005) argue that information provision may dominate environmental taxation in 
terms of welfare. They assume that a good produces a pollution externality during production 
(which does not affect the utility of consumers) and health damages during consumption (which 
affect utility of consumers). Consumers are not perfectly informed about the health damages 
resulting from consumption. Information provision then shifts demand to healthier products and 
at the same time reduces the environmental externality. Consequently, the required level of taxa-
tion is reduced and overall welfare increases. A broad body of literature pleads for supplementing 
pollution control policies by information measures to foster the diffusion of energy-efficient 
technologies (Bennear and Stavins 2007; Jaffe et al. 2005; Rolfe et al. 1999; Sijm 2005; Sorrell and 
Sijm 2003). It is argued that additional information measures may help to overcome asymmetric 
information on the technology market. They provide agents with knowledge about different en-
ergy-efficient options. Agents are thus enabled to respond efficiently to the incentives set out by 
pollution control policies. 
Measures to correct for external information problems may be twofold. On the one hand, the 
regulator may directly provide market participants with information. An example is the US Green 
Lights program, which provides information on energy-efficient lightning technology to busi-
nesses (Bennear and Stavins 2007). On the other hand, the regulator may require market partici-
pants to provide information to other market participants by certification or labelling. Producers 
of domestic appliances may be obliged to display a label on their products indicating the annual 
energy use and how this energy use compares to other products of the same category – as is done 
by the EnergyGuide in the United States (Bennear and Stavins 2007). In the housing sector, the 
landlord may be required to inform the tenant about the energy efficiency of his building, e.g. the 
level of insulation or the energy consumption of the appliances installed. In the European Union, 
this approach has been implemented by the energy certificate which has to be issued for each 
building by the owner (Sunikka 2003). Apart from mandatory information measures, voluntary 
labelling and certification programs, such as the Energy Star for particularly energy-efficient do-
mestic appliances in the United States, may be implemented to foster the diffusion of energy-
efficient technologies (for an overview of existing US programs see Banerjee and Solomon 2003). 
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Empirical studies on the Green Lights and Energy Star programs suggest that both have been 
successful at lowering energy consumption (DeCanio 1998; DeCanio and Watkins 1998; How-
arth et al. 2000). Sorrell and Sijm (2003, p. 432) argue that it eventually depends on the specific 
features of the market, the technology and the policies under examination whether or not infor-
mation policies are a useful component of a policy mix. Sorrell and Sijm expect that information 
provision will particularly improve the efficiency of pollution policies for households and small 
and medium-sized firms which are characterized by low energy price elasticity and large energy-
saving potential. 
Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1998) emphasize that supplementing pollution control policies by 
further policies may also be useful to overcome problems of internal asymmetric information 
within the firm. In this respect, they highlight the importance of standards for voluntary envi-
ronmental management systems such as the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 
14001 and the European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS).8 Among other, partici-
pating firms are required to set up organizational structures and to define responsibilities and 
procedures to attain pre-defined environmental goals. Thereby, environmental management sys-
tems may improve the flow of environmentally-relevant information within the firm and over-
come possible information asymmetries. Other programs have a similar intention. The U.S. 
Green Lights program requires firms to survey their facilities in exchange for providing them 
with information on energy-efficient lighting (Bennear and Stavins 2007). The U.S. Department 
of Energy (DoE) provides free energy audits to small and medium-sized firms that recommend 
desirable energy-saving projects (Anderson and Newell 2004). The possible effects of these pro-
grams have been subject to economic analysis. Anderson and Newell (2004) regard the inexpen-
sive DoE energy audits a success since roughly 50 percent of the suggested projects were actually 
adopted.9 Likewise, Wätzold and Bültmann (2001) find that the majority of firms participating in 
EMAS have reduced the use of polluting materials and have implemented ecologically motivated 
improvements of products and production processes. They explicitly estimate that the net value 
of reducing asymmetric information exceeds the corresponding transaction costs (borne by the 
government) for EMAS. Thus, information measures have proven in many cases to be a desirable 
complement to pollution control policies from an efficiency perspective. 
 
                                                 
8 EMAS can also be understood as a means to overcome external information asymmetries since it requires firms to 
publish environmental statements. Wätzold and Bültmann (2001) estimate, however, that this effect is limited since 
EMAS is directed to a specific site or company and not a specific product. 
9 Anderson and Newell (2004) qualify, however, that the fact that 50 percent of the projects were not adopted sug-
gests that asymmetric information is not the only reason for non-adoption. 
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4 Using a Policy Mix to Cope with High Transaction Costs of First-Best Single Policies 
Economic studies highlight that the implementation of single first-best policies for pollution con-
trol may bring about high transaction costs under three assumptions: if marginal damages of pol-
lution are distributed heterogeneously, if marginal abatement costs are heterogeneous or if pollut-
ers have incentives not to comply with a policy. It is emphasized that with each of these assump-
tions, transactions costs of a single first-best policy may well be prohibitively high, i.e. exceed the 
net value of internalizing the pollution externality. It is further demonstrated that the implemen-
tation of alternative single policies may reduce transaction costs but usually comes at a decreased 
net value of internalization as well. The balance of the net value of internalization and transaction 
costs may be positive for these alternative policies but pollution abatement is likely to be ineffi-
cient. The important point brought forward is that a policy mix may then reduce transaction 
costs and provide for a high net value of internalization. Thus, the balance of the net value of 
internalization and transaction costs may be positive for the policy mix and larger than for single 
policies. Available studies implicitly seem to assume that the policy mix also outperforms private 
governance structures although not much attention is drawn to this question. 
4.1 Heterogeneity of Marginal Pollution Damages 
4.1.1 Inefficiency of Single Policies 
It may be assumed that the spatial distribution of marginal pollution damages is homogeneous, 
i.e. the marginal damage produced by one pollution unit does not depend on the location of its 
emission and reception. Homogeneity is provided if pollutants are uniformly mixed in receiving 
airsheds or watersheds. This applies, for example, to carbon dioxide (CO2) and chlorofluorocar-
bons (CFCs). In this case, a pollution externality may be corrected efficiently by a single emis-
sion-based policy. For designing such a first-best policy, damages caused by one unit of pollution 
do not have to be determined by the regulator. Supposed that other transaction costs related to 
the policy are low as well, it can be set up and implemented easily. The balance of the net value of 
internalization and related transaction costs is likely to be positive. 
However, policy design and implementation become more complex with heterogeneous marginal 
pollution damages. Heterogeneity arises due to non-uniformly mixed pollutants, such as sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOX), and many water pollutants. In these cases, the concentra-
tions – and thus the marginal damages – caused by a pollution unit may vary considerably be-
tween locations – depending on ecological, technical, and socioeconomic conditions at the point 
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of emission as well as at the receptor point (Sterner 2003, p. 83).10 Montgomery (1972) demon-
strates that an efficient allocation of pollution units under these circumstances could theoretically 
be provided for by a single-policy strategy based on “ambient tradable permits”, which considers 
not only emissions but also the damage produced by each unit of pollution. Such permit systems 
require policy-makers to specify a vector of transfer coefficients for each emitter, linking emis-
sions from each source with concentrations at each of the predefined receptor points. An emitter 
has to acquire separate pollution permits for each receptor that is affected by its emissions. 
Krupnick et al. (1983) find that under this first-best permit system, administering agencies incur 
relatively low transaction costs. Their efforts are limited to specifying the transfer coefficients and 
allocating permits to polluters. Officials do not need information regarding abatement costs. In 
contrast, such permit systems result to be very costly for polluters since they have to participate 
in different permit markets for each receptor point. With many receptor locations, an emitting 
firm has to acquire and manage a very complex portfolio of necessary permits. Tietenberg (1995) 
points out that high transaction costs exceeding the expected net values of internalization have 
prevented first-best ambient permit systems from being implemented. Similarly, Kolstad (1987, p. 
340) argues that other spatially differentiated regulations like taxes may also fail due to high trans-
action costs. 
Tietenberg (1995, p. 101) points out the alternative policies taxing or trading heterogeneous pol-
lution units based on the level of emissions rather than on the actual damages of these emissions 
(e.g., emissions trading or emissions taxes) may bring about relatively low transaction costs but 
provide for inefficiencies in the presence of heterogeneous marginal pollution damages. Thus, the 
marginal net value of internalization is reduced. For example, when few large sources are concen-
trated around a receptor requiring large improvements in ambient air quality, they have to be 
controlled to a higher degree than distant sources, which hardly affect the receptor. Emission-
based policies, however, provide for marginal abatement costs to be equalized across all sources 
overcontrolling distant sources and undercontrolling adjacent sources. Thus, these approaches 
may aggravate existing or give rise to new so-called hot spots, where concentrations of pollutants 
and resulting damages exceed socially optimal levels. Smith (1999, p. 213) highlights that hot 
spots can affect the efficiency of emission-based instruments particularly negatively if damage 
functions for pollutants exhibit the characteristics of thresholds and other non-linearities. Under 
                                                 
10 The damages of pollution may vary over time, as well. For example, marginal damages of car emissions in urban 
areas will peak at daytime when the daily rhythm of the labour market causes congestion and rapid build-up of pol-
lutants to coincide with the highest concentration of people affected. Taking this into account, would make policy 
design and implementation even more complex. 
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these circumstances, marginal damages increase substantially once a certain level of pollution is 
exceeded.  
Attempts to improve the efficiency of single emission control policies in the presence of hetero-
geneous marginal pollution damages, may bring about high transaction costs. One modification 
that has been developed for emission permit trading makes use of trading zones to prevent hot 
spots. While trading within each zone is not limited, trading across zones is restricted.11 Krupnick 
et al. (1983) and Tietenberg (1995) report that, regarding transaction costs, this approach reverses 
the findings made for ambient trading schemes. Polluters incur relatively low transaction costs 
since they only have to participate in the permit market of the zone in which their facilities are 
located. In contrast, the administering agency has to determine and continuously readjust effi-
cient amounts of permits for each zone. To do so, it must gain knowledge of source-specific 
abatement costs in addition to the air-modelling data needed for ambient permit system. More-
over, Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) highlight that zonal systems may provide for inefficiencies 
in other fields as well since they prevent cost-saving trades between emitting sources in different 
zones. Thus, zonal trading increases transaction costs but does not necessarily increase the net 
value of internalization. Consequently, single-policy strategies may not efficiently cope with pollu-
tion problems if pollutants are non-uniformly mixed in the environment. 
4.1.2 Superiority of a Policy Mix 
In the presence of spatially heterogeneous marginal pollution damage, a policy mix combining an 
emissions tax or an emissions trading scheme with command-and-control policies may be supe-
rior to single policies. Regarding a tradable permit system, Krupnick et al. (1983) proposes the 
approach of “pollution offsets” allowing trading among sources as long as it does not violate 
ambient air quality standards at any receptor point. New emitters have to acquire permits from 
existing sources in order to completely “offset” the effects of the new emissions on pollutant 
concentrations at receptor points. This procedure provides for ambient quality goals to be at-
tained at least cost and is relatively easy to administer. The approach is advanced by McGartland 
and Oates (1985). They examine “modified pollution offsets” allowing trading among sources if 
neither the initial level of environmental quality nor certain predetermined ambient standards 
established by the environmental authority (whichever is more stringent) are exceeded. The ap-
proach promises to prevent the costly deterioration of air quality in areas where pollution con-
                                                 
11 This approach was pursued in the context of the RECLAIM program, a tradable permit system for NOX and SO2 
in the Los Angeles basin area. The basin was divided into a coastal and an inland zone. Within each zone, trading is 
not restricted. However, trades across zones are only allowed if permits are sold from facilities in the heavily polluted 
coastal zone to facilities in the inland zone (Hansjürgens and Fromm 1996; Tietenberg 1995, p. 107). 
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centration is already far below ambient air standards. McGartland and Oates show that their ap-
proach is cost-effective and achieves a higher level of environmental quality compared to the 
approach of “pollution offsets”. An alternative approach is proposed by Atkinson and Tietenberg 
(1982). They suggest “nondegradation offsets” that allow trading among sources as long as local 
ambient air quality standards for the worst receptor are met and the overall emissions do not 
increase.  
Either of the presented approaches combining market-based and command-and-control ap-
proaches provides for a second-best solution in the presence of non-uniformly mixed pollutants 
by sharing tasks between both policies. Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 187) highlight that emission 
permit systems allow for the reduction of marginal abatement costs across emitting sources. Am-
bient standards provide for guaranteed minimum benefits due to abatement and prevent hot 
spots. Compared to the ambient permit system, this approach saves transaction cost since firms 
are not required to participate in a multitude of separate markets. Compared to a zonal emission 
permit system, the approach involves only modest information demands on part of the environ-
mental authority. 
However, it is emphasized that the actual threat of hot spots and, thus, the actual advantages of a 
combination of market-based and command-and-control policies over pure market-based poli-
cies in terms of efficiency depend on at least two aspects. Firstly, Swift (2001, pp. 349-351; 2004) 
highlights that the relationship between the spatial distribution of marginal damages and the spa-
tial distribution of marginal abatement costs appears to be important. Swift’s empirical examina-
tion of the US Acid Rain Program for sulphur dioxide emissions suggests that marginal abate-
ment costs were lowest for the largest polluters. These polluters had the highest incentives to 
reduce their emissions under the emissions trading system. Thus, emissions trading abated pollu-
tion at the most heavily emitting sources first and rather “cooled” existing hot spots instead of 
exacerbating them. Secondly, Portney (2000, p. 118) and Swift (2000) report for the example of 
the Acid Rain Program that the implementation of market-based emissions policies may provide 
incentives to reduce emissions substantially at all existing sources. Thus, even given spatial reallo-
cations of emissions, pollution at hot spots everywhere will be reduced.  
4.2 Heterogeneity of Marginal Pollution Abatement Costs 
4.2.1 Inefficiency of Single Policies 
Price-based policies (such as taxes) and quantity-based policies (such as tradable permits) provide 
for efficient pollution control if the price or quantity for pollution set under each policy, respec-
tively, matches the intersection of the marginal abatement cost curve and the marginal damage 
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cost curve. Determining the marginal abatement cost curve is easy for the regulator if the costs of 
abating one unit of pollution are the same no matter by whom, where and when this is done. 
However, marginal pollution abatement costs are usually characterized by large heterogeneity. 
Polluters exhibit differences in the technologies they employ, the inputs they use, and the outputs 
they produce, all of which may have an effect on the direct and opportunity costs of pollution 
abatement. In order to determine the aggregated marginal abatement cost curve, the regulator has 
to find out about the characteristics of each polluter. Designing a first-best price-based or quan-
tity-based policy may thus bring about significant transaction costs (Sterner 2003, p. 165). Kwerel 
(1977) shows that, in theory, a regulator could learn about the true abatement costs by succes-
sively implementing and revising policies based on polluters’ responses to the policies. However, 
Bennear and Stavins (2007) point out that the marginal abatement cost curve may shift over time 
as well, for example, because of technological progress or changes in input and output prices. 
Thus, an iterative approach does not necessarily reduce the information demand for the regula-
tor.12 
If transaction costs impede a correct assessment of heterogeneous marginal abatement costs, 
regulators may choose to accept a certain degree of uncertainty regarding abatement costs and 
rely on more or less rough estimates. Under these circumstances, the implementation of price-
based policies as well as of quantity-based policies is likely to result in inefficient over- or under-
regulation. If, on the one hand, marginal abatement costs turn out to be lower than expected, the 
quantity restriction, which appeared to be optimal ex ante, will be not stringent enough compared 
to the social optimum resulting in too little abatement, whereas the tax chosen ex ante will be too 
high causing too much abatement. On the other hand, if marginal abatement costs prove to be 
higher than expected the reverse will be true: Abatement levels will be too high under the quan-
tity policy and too low under the tax (Johnstone 2003, p. 15). Thus, reducing transaction costs 
comes at the expense of a reduced net value of internalization. 
Weitzman (1974) demonstrates that price-based and quantity-based policies are not equally ineffi-
cient in the presence of uncertain abatement costs, i.e. the costs of overregulation by one policy 
do not exactly correspond to the costs of underregulation by the other. He finds that deadweight 
losses are smaller under a price-based policy than under a quantity-based policy if the slope of the 
(expected) marginal abatement cost function is greater than the (absolute value of the) slope of 
the marginal benefit function (the inverse of the marginal damage function). Correspondingly, the 
quantity-based policy is less inefficient than the price-based policy if the marginal benefit func-
                                                 
12 Moreover, a lot of investment decisions related to pollution abatement are long-term and cannot be reversed easily 
by policy revisions (Bennear and Stavins 2007). 
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tion is steeper than the marginal abatement cost function. Applying Weitzman’s finding to cli-
mate change, Pizer (1999; 2002) shows that price-based policies should be preferred since the 
marginal damages curve of carbon dioxide emissions is rather flat. Hoel and Karp (2001) and 
Newell and Pizer (2003) confirm this finding for a dynamic context where the marginal damage 
of emissions is a function of the stock of pollutants accumulated over time. Nevertheless, a pol-
icy mix may be superior to both price-based and quantity-based policies, i.e. provide for a higher 
net value of internalization, irrespective of the assumptions about marginal cost and benefit 
curves.  
4.2.2 Superiority of a Policy Mix 
Roberts and Spence (1976) demonstrate that the combination of quantity-based and price-based 
policies provides for a better outcome in terms of social costs than either policy individually. 
They propose a permit trading system which is supplemented by taxes and subsidies.13 Their 
three-part policy combines the advantages of price-based and quantity-based policies and com-
pensates for their deficiencies. On the one hand, the tax protects against unexpectedly high per-
mit prices if true marginal abatement costs are higher than anticipated and a pure permit trading 
system would result in too much abatement. The mechanism works as follows: The regulator 
allows polluters to generate emissions in excess of their permit holdings but charges a tax per unit 
of such emission (or requires polluters to buy additional permits from the regulator at a fixed 
price). If the permit price actually rises above the tax rate, polluters with even higher marginal 
abatement costs will choose to pay the tax rather than buy permits on the market. Hence, the tax 
acts as a “safety valve” that caps the permit price and prevents inefficiencies due to extraordinary 
price increases.14 On the other hand, subsidies may stimulate further abatement if marginal 
abatement costs are lower than expected and a pure permit trading system would result in too 
little abatement.15 In order to do so, the regulator pays firms for every unit of pollution that falls 
below their actual permit holdings. The subsidy sets a floor for the permit price since any polluter 
will rather collect this payment than sell his permits on the market at a lower price. Within this 
price range, the permit system provides for the attainment of the pollution reduction target de-
termined ex ante. Thus, such three-part policy sets binding emission targets as long as costs are 
                                                 
13 See also Weitzman (1978). 
14 Similarly, a regulator can also provide for cost certainty by creating a permit reserve which he can bring on the 
market in the case of unexpectedly high permit prices. This approach has the disadvantage, however, that the price 
can only be capped for as long as the permit reserve holds (Johnstone 2003, p. 17). Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) 
mention that price certainty under a permit trading scheme can be provided for by banking and borrowing provi-
sions as well – however not to the same extent as by a safety valve. 
15 Baumol and Oates (1988, pp. 222-223) demonstrate, however, that subsidizing firms for pollution abatement in-
volves dynamic inefficiencies. 
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reasonable and allows the target to rise (tightens the target) if costs are unexpectedly high (low). 
Similarly, Smith (1999, p. 212) suggests to implement taxes and subsidies as a supplement to 
command-and-control policies, which guarantee quantity, but at uncertain abatement cost.  
The use of a safety valve has been examined particularly for the context of climate change poli-
cies. Fearing high costs of carbon abatement that may even exceed its benefits, McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen (1997a; 1997b) suggest an international agreement on climate change establishing a 
system that combines national emission permits and fees.16 According to their approach, each 
country would be allowed to allocate emission permits equal to its 1990 carbon emissions, and 
would agree to sell additional permits at a fee specified in the agreement. They propose an inter-
nationally uniform initial fee of US$ 10 per ton of carbon. Kopp et al. (1997; 1999) focus on de-
signing a domestic permit trading scheme for greenhouse gas emissions in the United States in 
the presence of abatement cost uncertainty. They suggest the allocation of permits for the emis-
sion of 1,460 million tons of carbon (this corresponds to the actual carbon emissions in the US in 
1996) and a price cap of US$ 25 per ton of carbon. With respect to a global climate change pol-
icy, Pizer (2002) finds that the hybrid approach performs slightly better than the price-based ap-
proach but considerably better than the quantity-based approach. An optimal hybrid policy 
would set a global carbon emission target of 5 gigatons and a safety valve of US$ 7 per ton of 
carbon emission. Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) emphasize that national safety valves may impair 
the operation and efficiency of an international permit trading scheme. If the safety valve in one 
country is set below the clearing price on the international permit market, polluters will rather 
buy their permits at the domestic safety valve price than on the international permit market. The 
lowest national price cap would therefore determine the international permit price.  
4.3 Non-Compliance by Polluters 
4.3.1 Inefficiency of Single Policies 
As Cropper and Oates (1992) point out, it is often assumed in economic literature that firms and 
individuals comply perfectly with pollution policies they are subject to. For example, firms are 
supposed to keep their emissions within the limitation prescribed under a standard or to accu-
rately report their emissions and pay the required fees. The policy does not bring about transac-
tion costs since the regulator does not have to invest resources in monitoring and enforcement. 
                                                 
16 Apart from high abatement costs, McKibbin and Wilcoxen especially fear that a pure permit trading system on an 
international level would result in inacceptably high wealth transfers from developed to developing coutries, that it 
would put enormous stress on the world trade system, that it would be inoperable due to the allocation of excess 
permits, particularly to countries of the former Soviet Union, and that it would be difficult to monitor and enforce.  
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Under otherwise perfect conditions, a single first-best policy can be implemented to correct for a 
pollution externality. 
However, Becker (1968) highlights that individuals may have an incentive not to comply with 
regulation. This incentive arises because pollution policies usually bring about additional costs for 
the individual (either for abatement measures or tax payments and permit purchases), which can 
be avoided by non-compliance (Gersbach 2002).17 Consequently, the regulator has to incur trans-
action costs for the proper monitoring and enforcement of a pollution policy. Transaction costs 
rise with the level of information asymmetry between the regulator and the individuals (Sterner 
2003, p. 106). Moreover, Bohm and Russell (1985) emphasize that monitoring and enforcement 
costs are particularly high with numerous and mobile sources of pollution polluters. This applies, 
for example, to waste disposal and car emissions. Reducing monitoring and enforcement efforts 
to bring down transaction costs comes at rising costs of non-compliance. Fullerton and Kinna-
man (1995) state, for example, that the illegal disposal or burning of waste in order not to pay a 
tax on garbage may even deteriorate the pollution problems related to waste and produce new 
externalities. Palmer and Walls (1997) make the point that the costs of monitoring and enforce-
ment, or the costs due to non-compliance, may (partly) outweigh or even exceed the net value of 
reducing pollution, i.e. implementing the policy may not be advisable from an efficiency point of 
view. Downing and Watson (1974) demonstrate that with positive enforcement costs, the optimal 
level of pollution abatement will be less than when these costs are ignored. 
If monitoring and enforcing a first-best direct regulation on a polluting good is very costly, pol-
icy-makers may bring down transaction costs by regulating related goods that are easier observ-
able.18 Eskeland and Jimenez (1992) point out that the intuitive suggestion is to tax complements 
to a polluting good and subsidize cleaner substitutes. For example, if it is too costly for a regula-
tor to monitor and enforce a direct tax on car emissions, he may choose to tax fuels (complemen-
tary input to car emissions) or to subsidize catalysers or public transportation (substitutes to car 
emissions). If the regulator faces difficulties in implementing a tax on waste disposal, he may 
likewise tax packaging or consumption in general or subsidize returning and recycling waste. Sub-
sidies bear the additional advantage that they provide incentives to disclose information (e.g. a 
polluter may only receive a subsidy if he provides adequate evidence of recycling) and increase 
                                                 
17 However, the actual extent of non-compliance is debatable. Harrington (1988) points out that substantial compli-
ance may exist in spite of only modest monitoring and enforcement efforts.  
18 Several authors point out that in order to bring down monitoring and enforcement costs, the regulator may also 
increase fines (see, e.g., Becker 1968) or implement differentiated monitoring and enforcement systems (see, e.g., 
Harrington 1988). 
22 
the utility of compliance by reducing the cost of pollution abatement (e.g. by subsidizing abate-
ment technologies or appropriate waste disposal). 
In spite of reducing the cost of monitoring and enforcement and non-compliance, these policies 
do not necessarily provide for cost-minimizing pollution abatement – and thus decrease the net 
value of internalization – if implemented in isolation.19 Inefficiencies arise because indirect taxes 
and subsidies do not perfectly mimic the substitution and output reduction effects that provide 
for efficient resource allocation under a direct tax (see, e.g., Fullerton and Wolverton 1999). Es-
keland and Jimenez (1992, p. 155) point out that the taxation of dirty inputs to the production of 
polluting goods, such as fuels, provides incentives to switch to cleaner inputs and to reduce the 
production of a good. However, it does not stimulate polluters to employ potentially cheap tech-
nologies to reduce emissions with dirty inputs, e.g. catalytic converters or scrubbers. Taxing dirty 
technologies, in turn, does neither provide incentives to switch fuels nor guarantee the proper 
maintenance of cleaner alternatives. Alternatively, the regulator may tax the output or consump-
tion of related goods. Palmer et al. (1997) point out that the taxation of disposable goods – in-
stead of their actual disposal – reduces waste disposal since it discourages their consumption. 
However, it fails to stimulate waste reduction by recycling and the use of recycled inputs rather 
than virgin inputs. In fact, Palmer et al. find that the overall amount of recycling will decline with 
decreasing consumption.  
Subsidies to clean inputs, such as low-emission fuels, pollution abatement technologies, and recy-
cled resources, or on clean activities, such as recycling, stimulate substitution processes but lack 
sufficient output reduction effects. For example, Palmer et al. (1997) state that a subsidy to recy-
cling sets an incentive to substitute virgin inputs. Yet, they highlight that the subsidy may encour-
age consumption and thus waste generation because it reduces the effective price of a potentially 
polluting good for users. This finding has been made for the case of direct subsidies for pollution 
abatement as well. Several authors emphasize that subsidies will be inefficient in this context be-
cause they will foster the entry of new polluters, which in turn increases overall production, con-
sumption and pollution (Baumol and Oates 1988; Kohn 1991; Porter 1974). 
4.3.2 Superiority of a Policy Mix 
If monitoring and enforcing first-best direct pollution control policies is very costly and indirect 
policies bring about inefficiencies in pollution abatement, the implementation of a policy mix 
                                                 
19 Moreover, Sandmo (1976) and Wijkander (1985) emphasize that taxing complements and subsidizing substitutes 
may result in inefficient distortions in a general equilibrium framework if complements and substitutes are related to 
other, non-polluting goods as well, or if the demand for complements and the demand for substitutes are related to 
one another. 
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may be a superior strategy. In particular, it may be useful to combine indirect taxes and subsidies. 
As Bohm (1981) makes clear, the classic application of this concept is the deposit-refund sys-
tem.20 At some point in the chain of market transactions, a potential polluter is subjected to a tax 
(the deposit) in the amount of the potential damage he may produce, which he has to pay under 
the presumption that the pollution and the related damage actually occur. At a later point, he 
receives a subsidy (the refund) if certain conditions are met, e.g. if he can prove that a certain 
product has been returned to specified place or that a specified type of damage has not occurred. 
Bohm and Russell (1985) point out that deposit-refund systems can be implemented for the con-
sumption of products which may create pollution damages, e.g. beverage containers, mercury and 
cadmium batteries, refrigerators, vehicles, or waste in general, and production processes poten-
tially providing for hazardous emissions of chemicals or the disposal of toxic wastes. 
Deposit-refund systems combine the advantages of single indirect taxes and subsidies and com-
pensate for their disadvantages. Fullerton and Wolverton (1999) and Yohe and MacAvoy (1987) 
highlight that deposit-refund systems provide for a substantial reduction in transaction costs 
compared to direct pollution control policies since costly monitoring of pollution is avoided. 
What is more, deposit-refund systems do not exhibit the inefficiencies of indirect taxes and sub-
sidies with respect to pollution abatement costs. In fact, Fullerton and Wolverton (1999) show 
that a deposit-refund system may perfectly mimic a first-best Pigovian tax on pollution. The tax 
component provides for an optimal reduction of output, while the subsidy component efficiently 
stimulates substitution of dirty goods and activities by cleaner ones. Thus, the policy mix pro-
vides for a high net value of internalization at relatively low transaction costs. 
There is a large body of literature discussing the use of deposit-refund systems to reduce waste 
generation and its illegal disposal. Dinan (1993) demonstrates that the combination of a tax on 
goods that may eventually be disposed and a subsidy to end-users of recycled materials is equiva-
lent to a waste-end tax and performs better than a tax on virgin inputs. Fullerton and Kinnaman 
(1995) suggest a combination of a tax on output and a rebate on proper disposal through either 
recycling or garbage collection. They point out that this policy mix may yield a first-best outcome 
and outperforms single output taxes or recycling subsidies. Their finding is supported by Palmer 
et al. (1997) who compute that single-policy alternatives may be at least twice as costly as the 
proposed deposit-refund system. In addition, Palmer and Walls (1997) show that the combina-
tion of an output tax and a recycling subsidy exhibits an efficiency that is far above that of recy-
                                                 
20 Bohm (1981) distinguishes between government-initiated and market-initiated deposit-refund systems. Since the 
focus of this paper is on using a policy mix, we only discuss government-initiated deposit-refund systems. However, 
the existence of market-initiated deposit refund systems demonstrates that pollution externalities can also be cor-
rected by governance structures other than the market if only the private benefits of doing so are high enough. 
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cled content standards, which require that a certain percentage of total material use be comprised 
of secondary materials. The same finding is made by Sigman (1995) for the special case of lead 
disposal. Walls and Palmer (2001) extent the analysis of this type of deposit-refund systems to a 
setting with multiple lifecycle externalities. They show that under these circumstances, the opti-
mal tax on output will be greater than the optimal subsidy for recycling. An alternative deposit-
refund system is brought forward by Fullerton and Wu (1998). They highlight that the combina-
tion of a tax on packaging with a subsidy to recyclability of goods may provide for an optimal 
resource allocation as well. On a more general level, Fullerton and Wolverton (2005) analyse how 
deposit-refund systems can yield an optimal outcome in a second-best world with pre-existing tax 
distortions.  
A case for the use of deposit-refund systems is also made with respect to air pollution. Regarding 
car emissions, Fullerton and West (2000) show that the combination of a tax on gasoline and a 
subsidy to newer cars can attain 71 percent of the welfare gain of a Pigovian emissions tax, 
whereas a tax on gasoline alone will only yield 60 percent. With respect to emissions from sta-
tionary sources, Porter (1974) and Kohn (1991) discuss the combination of a periodical “entry 
tax” – by which the polluter purchases the rights to produce and emit and which is based on 
prospected baseline emissions of production in the absence of emission abatement – with a sub-
sidy per unit of emission that is actually abated during the period. This approach is efficient and 
makes cheating more risky since emission reports may be double-checked with reported abate-
ment. While Porter rejects his idea as impractical, it is revived by Kohn who states that the emis-
sion data required is already researched and published by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. A similar proposal is made by Yohe and MacAvoy (1987). They suggest combining a tax 
on the sulphur content of coal used in production with a subsidy for proven removal of sulphur 
from the industrial effluent and show that this two-part policy yields a first-best outcome. A dif-
ferent approach is pursued by Swierzbinski (1994). He develops a system in which the firm has to 
report its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report. If the firm is monitored, it re-
ceives a subsidy if actual emissions turn out to coincide with reported emissions. Whether or not 
this system is efficient depends among other on the limitations to enforcement.  
A somewhat concluding point on the applicability of deposit-refund systems is made by Fullerton 
and Wolverton (1999). They emphasize that the idea of this two-part policy can be transferred to 
a very general level. The refund may be paid to an individual other than the one who paid the 
deposit, the optimal refund may be a different amount than the deposit, and refund and deposit 
may even refer to different commodities.  
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Alternatively to deposit-refund systems, some authors suggest combinations of taxes and stan-
dards. For stationary emission sources, Walls and Palmer (2001) demonstrate that in order to 
provide for a first-best outcome, an output tax has to be combined with a standard that limits 
emissions per unit of output. Likewise, an input tax should be supplemented by an emission 
standard per unit of input. Eskeland (1994) highlights that when car emissions cannot be ob-
served directly, the simultaneous implementation of a tax on gasoline and an emission abatement 
requirement for cars performs better than the isolated use of either policy. The policy mix mimics 
the incentives of a first-best direct emissions fee since the gasoline tax provides for fewer miles 
driven while the abatement standard reduces the emissions per mile driven. Similarly, Innes 
(1996) suggests gasoline taxation and automobile standards. As an alternative to the latter com-
ponent, he discusses the taxation of automobiles. He recommends that this should be imposed in 
relation to vehicle features that affect emissions, such as fuel economy or vehicle age. The opti-
mal automobile tax equals the social costs of the vehicle’s predicted emissions, less the portion of 
these costs that are internalized by the gasoline tax. 
Apart from using mixes of indirect policies, some studies also propose to supplement direct poli-
cies for pollution control by further policies in order to overcome problems of monitoring and 
enforcement. Johnstone (2003, p. 17) suggests to combine an emissions trading scheme with a 
punitive tax which has to be paid per unit of emission which is not covered by emission allow-
ances.  Like a fine, the tax reduces incentives for non-compliance by diminishing its expected 
utility, and thus reduces monitoring requirements for the regulator. Gawel (1991; 1993, p. 12) and 
Knorring and Welzel (1998) highlight that compliance with standards may also be improved by 
punitive taxes. Similarly, rules to hold firms liable for potential damages from their pollution may 
improve compliance with pollution control policies. Bohm and Russell (1985, p. 435) emphasize 
that liability rules may be particularly useful if monitoring polluting activities is expensive but the 
source of discharges and spills can be easily identified ex post. Schwarze (1995) demonstrates that 
liability fosters the enforcement of pollution standards even when the compensation to be paid 
by the polluter can be expected to be below the actual damage from pollution. Nevertheless, Es-
keland and Jimenez (1992, p. 159) state that low likelihood of detection, high costs to victims for 
representation and litigation, underdeveloped judicial processes, or the potential insolvency of a 
liable party may limit the usefulness of liability rules in addition to pollution policies. 
5 Conclusion 
There is an increasingly large body of economic literature discussing the use of multiple policies – 
a so-called policy mix – to cope with single pollution problems. This article provides a review of 
studies in this field. To guide and structure the review, an analytical framework is developed and 
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applied. Based on seminal work by Coase (1960), the framework integrates transaction costs into 
the analysis of environmental problems and policies to overcome them. Moreover, it is high-
lighted that pollution externalities come into being not only because the market fails but due to 
the failure of private governance structures – including the market, bargains and firms – in gen-
eral. Two basic rationales are derived which underlie the economic literature on using a policy 
mix. On the one hand, it may be necessary to combine policies to correct for multiple reinforcing 
failures of private governance structures, such as pollution externalities, technological spillovers 
and asymmetric information. On the other hand, a policy mix may be used if the implementation 
of single first-best policies brings about high transaction costs – e.g., when marginal pollution 
damages and marginal abatement costs are heterogeneous or polluters are unlikely to comply with 
a policy. Available studies provide a broad picture of how a policy mix may help to improve effi-
ciency compared to single policy strategies. The general rationales identified may also provide 
useful guidance for understanding, evaluating and possibly justifying an actually implemented 
policy mix, as it can be found throughout many countries. 
Nevertheless, the framework is also useful to identify limitations of available economic research 
on using a policy mix. These limitations may open up avenues for future research. First of all, the 
economic literature drawing on the rationale of using a policy mix to correct for multiple rein-
forcing failures of private governance structures typically neglects transaction costs of policy im-
plementation – or rather assumes that these are sufficiently low. Yet, the second part of this re-
view has demonstrated that this cannot be taken for granted. Future research in this field there-
fore has to consider the transaction costs coming along with the policy mix as they may preclude 
the use of certain policies in the mix or of regulation in general. 
Secondly, most studies on policy mixes do not reflect on the use of private governance structures 
rather than regulation. This seems to be straightforward since pollution externalities, technologi-
cal spillovers and asymmetric information can be considered as a failure of private governance 
structures. Yet, this failure may stem from institutional, including regulatory, constraints. It may 
be worthwhile to explore what these constraints are and whether modifying or abolishing some 
of them may allow for private solutions that are superior to regulation in terms of efficiency. It 
has been pointed out, for example, that if pollution externalities are reinforced by externalities of 
technological change, research joint ventures can do as well as technology subsidies in supple-
menting emission policies under certain conditions (see Katsoulacos et al. 2001). The only re-
quirement with respect to regulation would be to allow for research joint ventures. Likewise, it 
may be promising to test for the potential of, e.g., private certification and labelling agreements to 
overcome asymmetric information or privately initiated deposit-refund systems to avoid the 
27 
monitoring problems of single pollution policies. There may be instances where supporting such 
private schemes is more efficient than implementing government-initiated programs. 
Thirdly and more generally, available studies on policy mixes are often conducted on a rather 
abstract, theoretical level. The incorporation of transaction costs into the analysis of a policy mix 
for pollution control calls for more empirical work. As Zerbe and McCurdy (1999) point out, it 
can only be determined on a case-by-case basis what the actual transaction costs are and whether 
a policy mix should be implemented or not. In order to provide for reliable recommendations, 
future analyses have to take into account a variety of aspects determining the level of transaction 
costs, such as the characteristics of the environmental resources, of the resource users, of the 
transactions taking place and of the institutional environment all of them are embedded in. 
As a fourth limitation, existing studies usually analyze the combination of policies with idealized 
and simplified designs. However, policies that are actually implemented are often far from match-
ing the theoretically ideal design. For example, policies may account for special rules for certain 
stakeholder groups. The actual design may well impair the theoretical efficiency of the policy mix, 
i.e. reduce the net value of internalization or increase transaction costs. Economists intending to 
give advice to policy-makers will therefore have to consider the actual design of the policy mix. 
Finally, studies presented in the review analyze how an optimal policy mix should theoretically 
look like under certain assumptions. Yet, it may well turn out that a policy mix exists in reality 
although none of presented rationales applies – or that no policy mix has been implemented de-
spite economic insight to do so. In order to provide for applicable economic policy recommenda-
tions, further research is necessary analyzing how an existing policy mix has actually come about 
in a certain context. Policy-makers are subject to a variety of constraints and incentives that guide 
their decisions. For example, regulatory decisions on policies for pollution control may be taken 
at multiple levels, e.g., by the EU and national governments. The responsibilities of different lev-
els may overlap and result in simultaneous policy-making. In addition, policy-makers may be in-
fluenced by multiple stakeholders of the policies with possibly contrary interests. Moreover, pol-
icy-makers usually do not only pursue environmental and efficiency goals but other, potentially 
contradictory ones as well, such as equity. Only if these constraints are taken into account, rea-
sonable recommendations for the design and implementation of an optimal policy mix can be 
derived. It may be one result of this positive analysis, that the existing policy mix exhibits ineffi-
ciencies but represents the optimal choice if all constraints are considered. It may be another re-
sult, that in order for a superior policy mix to be implemented, some of the constraints have to 
be eliminated or changed. 
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